THE SETTLEMENT OF VERSAILLES
Poland regained her freedom and her statehood in the historical transformation which can he named the settlement of Versailles. In fact, this settlement was established not only iby the treaty of Versailles: also the treaties of Saint-Germain, of Trianon and even the Polish-Soviet Russian treaty of Riga of 1921 (confirmed by the Allied Powers in 11923) belong to it. And moreover, important facts have been created not by treaties, but by a series of “faits accomplis”, which were the result of a number of liberating, national revolutions in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, in Yugoslavia and elsewhere. But without any doubt, the cornerstone of the system of Versailles was the treaty of Versailles, signed on 28th June 1919 between the Allied Powers and Germany6).
From the first day after the signing of that treaty German and pro-German propaganda throughout the world started to criticize that treaty as allegedly being unjust to Germany. During the 20 inter-war years the attacks against the system of Versailles were poisoning international relations and undermining European and world peace. It was not only Hitler, but also the German Weimar Republic who were working for an overthrow of the European territorial settlement of Versailles. Also Great Britain and her most important leader at the most critical moments of the period in question, Mr. David Lloyd George,
6) It is an intention of the author of this book to write a larger historical work in English under the title “The Territorial Settlement of Versailles”. He was not yet able to write this larger work but he used in this book some of the material gathered for it.
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3 — In Defence
but also some other of her leaders, such as Messrs Balfour, Curzon, Macdonald or Neville Chamberlain contributed to the overthrow of the Versailles settlement and were helped in this toy the pro-British and pro-German, Socialist wing of Polish politicians, such as Marshal Pil- sudski and Colonel Beck, a left-wing military junta who seized power by a coup d’etat and a 3-days civil war (causing 379 fatal casualties, not counting the 920 wounded), directed against the right wing, Nationalist, Roman Catholic and peasant parliamentary majority. The ominous agreements off Locarno (1925) and Munich (1938), made without Poland and against Poland, were great steps on the way towards the Second World War because their real purpose was the undermining of the settlement of Versailles.
Professor App does not mention the peace of Versailles by its name but it is obvious that his aim is overthrowing not only the settlement of 1945, but also the settlement of Versailles of 1919. He would like to see a resurrection of something like the system off pre-11914, which would lead very quickly and inevitably to a quite different further reshuffle, bringing about a new order resembling the Central - and East-European settlement imposed by an apparently victorious, imperial Germany in the Gerrnan- Russian Peace of Brest Of 3rd March 1918, or the German plans, prepared after 1941 in consequence of the illusory victories Of Hitler.
This is not my intention to defend the Treaty of Versailles as a whole. I do not deny that some of its clauses might have contained some mistaken, or unreal solutions, — perhaps dictated by an unrealistic, American idealism. But what concerns the territorial settlement in Europe, brought about by that treaty, I am firmly convinced that in principle that treaty was just, equitable and reasonable and that if it contained some unfortunate solutions — these were those which were made in favour and not against Germany and were dictated by a weakness towards the demands of that country.
The territorial settlement of Versailles was based on the principle that Germany should not dominate Europe and that all viable European nations should be independent, forming together a great block of countries endangered by possible German domination and bound together by a feeling of a natural solidarity in face of possible new German expansion. The two great reforms df the political structure of Europe, brought about by the Versailles settlement were the resurrection of an independent Poland that was not only an indispensable making up for a great wrong committed in 17712-1705 and 1815, but also an act of the building once again of a strong Eastern bulwark against possible new German expansionist ambitions; and the dissolution of the anachronistic, non-viable Austro-Hungarian empire, which was supporting by its existence Germany’s political and strategical position and preponderance and was depriving of their liberty, or limiting the liberty off such important and viable nations as the Czechs, the Southern Slavs (Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes) and the Rumanians and at the same time giving too great a power to Hungary which could dominate Slovak, Rumanian, Serb and Croatian territories only by being able to lean on the German and also Austrian-German support.
In consequence of the Versailles settlement, a natural block of countries, interested in preserving peace — and at the same time representing justice and liberty — was formed. It was composed of France, Poland and the Danubian countries ((Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia). And such countries as Britain and Italy, in the long run also endangered by Germany, were also its natural allies. If this system had been wholeheartedly supported by all the nations who were naturally interested in its preservation, peace would have lasted for many generations. Also the possible expansion by Soviet Russia would have been contained by a peaceful and orderly Europe, dominated by the solidarity of the free, non-German nations.
But the Versailles settlement was disliked, or was not understood, by a number of politicians in some non-German countries.
The decisive factor in this was Great Britain. Britain was in fact against the Versailles settlement. British policy in the years il919-tl938 was dictated by the obsolete principle of “balance of power”. British politicians believed that Europe after Versailles had become dominated by France and her continental allies, and therefore these countries should be opposed and Germany should become strengthened against them. Also the irrational British
dislike of France and especially off Poland has contributed towards the crystallization of a consistent, British anti- Versailles policy, which favoured the slow revival of German power and brought about the overthrowing of the system of Versailles by the conference off Munich and the destruction of Czechoslovakia, and finally by the Second World War.
But also the imprudent and faint-hearted policies of some French politicians (such as Briand, the co-author of the pact of Locarno which weakened the Versailles settlement already in 1925) and even more so the suicidal foreign policies of the left wing, military dictature in Poland after the 1926 coup d’etat (Pilsudski, Beck), contributed greatly to the final victory of the British and German anti-Versailles drive — and to the outbreak of the Second World War, to the Polish catastrophe of 1939, to the defeat of France in 1940 and to the dangers which befell Britain in 1940 and 1941 and brought about the final reduction of the role of Britain, ceasing to be a first rank great power.
What was wrong with the settlement of Versailles? What was the substance of the critique, which was directed against it?
Two main reproaches were directed against Versailles. The one was, that it brought about a “Balkanization” of the Continent of Europe. The second was that it was unjust and injurious towards Germany.
To deal with the accusation of “Balkanization” one Should first ask — what was wrong with “Balkanization” in the Balkan itself. Was it a wrong turn of historical development that such nations as Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Rumania liberated themselves from the Turkish yoke? Would it be more just, or perhaps more expedient if they were still under the Ottoman rule? And what harm did the “Balkanization” of the Balkan Peninsula bring to the world, to Europe, or to the Balkan nations themselves? The enormous political, social, cultural, economic and even moral and psychological progress of the Balkan countries after they became independent is an evident and undeniable fact; Turkish governors continuing to rule in Athens, Belgrade, Sofia and Bucharest would certainly be a repulsive monstrosity. So, what is wrong with the change which took place? One speaks sometimes that Balkan, namely Serbian politics were the cause of the outbreak of the First World War. This is simply not true. That war was caused by imperialistic policies of Austria-Hungary which wanted to subjugate Serbia, and in the background, the real moving force which pushed the world towards that war was the deliberate aggressive aim of the German Empire, — an aim which a West-German historian, Fritz Fischer, called, using this as a title Of his major book: “Griff nach der Weltmacht”, — the grip for world power. (Diisseldorf 19611, Droste Verlag).
And now: in what respect was the Continent of Europe “Balkanized” ? Two countries which did not exist as independent states in 1914, were created by the settlement of Versailles: Poland, which in its present frontiers has today 35 million inhabitants, and Czechoslovakia, which has now 18 million. One small Balkan country,' Rumania, which before 1914 had 6 million inhabitants, became a country of 21 million. Two little Balkan countries, Serbia and Montenegro, which had 3 million and a quarter of a million inhabitants respectively have now been replaced by one great Yugoslav state which has now 21 million. Only the Austro-Hungarian empire, with 56 million inhabitants has been dissolved. In it, Hungary, which — as a half- independent state before 1914 — had more than 20 million inhabitants has been reduced, as a completely independent state, to its present 10 million.
What is wrong with the building of nationally homogenous states of that size? How many independent states existed and continue to exist on the Continent of Europe, being much smaller not only than Poland, not only than Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia, but even than present day Hungary? If Denmark with its 5 million, Switzerland with 6 million, Belgium with 10 million, Portugal with 10 million, the Netherlands with their 14 million inhabitants can be independent in Europe and sometimes in the very center of the European Continent and do not cause by their existence a Balkanization of Europe, why should Poland and her only slightly smaller neighbours be considered to be incompatible with the principle that European countries should not be of “Balkan” size?
The reproach that the Versailles settlement brought about a “Balkanization” of the Continent of Europe is simply nonsense.
Even less justified is the accusation that the peace of Versailles was not just towards Germany.
First of all, one should remember what sorts of peace settlements were imposed upon their enemies by Germany or Prussia after the wars in which they were victorious.
I will leave aside the treatment applied toy Prussia to Poland in 1772, 1708 and 1705, or in 1815. I shall limit myself to pointing to the Franco-Prussian settlement of 1871, according to which France lost to Germany such a large province as Alsace-Lorraine, and had to pay within a very short period of time an indemnity of 5 billion francs.
And the Peace of Brest-Litovsk of 1918 (German- Ukrainian February 9, German-Russian March 3), which was an act of establishing German political domination, partial permanent occupation, partial annexation and a system of ruthless exploitation over almost half of Europe.
I am not speaking about what has (been done toy Hitler, because this was already after Versailles.
Reciprocity is a principle of international law. What you have done to me, I have the right to do to you. In fact, France would have been entitled to annex the Rhineland, or Baden, or to impose a large indemnity upon Germany in the peace of Versailles as a retaliation for what was done to her in 1871. And Poland, which was a victim not only of what happened in 1772, 1793, 1795 and 1815, but also of a number of particular peace treaty clauses, as well as of the general principles of the Brest-Litovsk system, and suffered during the war a great amount of losses and unjustices inflicted upon her by German rule and German occupation, was entitled to severe compensations and indemnities on the part of Germany.
Nothing of that sort happened. The settlement of Versailles was a model of scrupulous adherence to principles of justice and moderation.
Not one scrap of territory with a really German population was detached from the German Reich, — with the sole exception of the City of Danzig, about which I shall speak later, which was organized into a little German state, in fact ruled by Berlin. On the contrary, many territories with a Polish population remained under German rule. No real economic hardships were imposed upon Germany.
The treaty of Versailles was conceived in such a way as to eliminate the danger of a new resurgence of German power and expansionist ambition and in particular limited its freedom of re-armament (allowing Germany, however, to have an army, sufficient for national defence) — but did not limit German independence. Germany remained, after Versailles, a free country, being in possession of all really German lands which belonged to her before 1914, able to powerfully develop her economy and to live a flourishing German cultural life.
The main complaint of the Germans of that time was that they did not have sufficient space for their life, that they were a nation without space, “Volk ohne Raum”. But having more space would mean taking land from other nations. And the post - 1945 experience has shown that Germany can live and prosper even on a much reduced territory, with a much denser population. On that reduced territory there was after 1945 enough living space not only for the millions of Germans from the East, but also for great numbers of “guest workers” from Turkey, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Morocco and other countries.
The settlement of Versailles safeguarded the existence and security of other countries but was painstaking and scrupulous in safeguarding also the legitimate rights of the German nation to independence, freedom, wellbeing and security.
The settlement was in fact to a very great extent the work of Poland.
A plan for such a settlement was formulated by the great Polish statesman Roman Dmowski (1864-1939), at one time leader of the Polish Kolo (deputation) in the Russian Parliament (Douma), later President of the Polish National Committee in Paris in the years 1917-1919 and in 1919 the main Polish negotiator at the Paris peace conference and one of the two Polish signatories of the Treaty of Versailles. He published in London a .privately printed, 89 page long memorandum “Problems of Central and Eastern Europe”, dated July 1917, which he distributed as a secret document in summer 1917 among allied statesmen and diplomatists7).
7) In its original, English version this is a very rare publication. The author of the present book has personal knowledge of only
A comparison of that memorandum of July 19il7 with the actual stipulations of the treaty of Versailles of June 1919 shows that the treaty of Versailles was in broad lines the putting into practice of the suggestions of Dmowski. And this, in spite of the fact that even in 1918 Lloyd George proclaimed, in a speech made on January 5th, that the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire does not belong to allied plans of a post-war settlement, and that even some Polish politicians, such as Paderewski, Pilsudski and August Zaleski, put forward in 1918 programmes, completely different from the settlement of Versailles, as well as from Dmowski’s suggestions of 1917.
Dmowski told the allied statesmen that the post-war territorial settlement in Europe should ibe based on two main principles: the building of a strong, fully independent Poland, stretching from the Carpathian mountains to the sea — and the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire and the building in its stead of three strong states of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania, as well as a fourth one, in form of a fully independent purely Hungarian (Magyar) Hungary.
His programme was fulfilled in its general outlines — but with two exceptions.
Poland was not made as strong as she could have been: she was deprived of important territories which should have been returned to her and which were indispensable for her life, and of which the most important were the city of Gdansk and the remaining part of Upper Silesia.
And Germany was not deprived of her overseas colony which was the original land of the exterminated heathen Prussians, called Eastern Prussia. Dmowski suggested making it into an autonomous republic, or province, with 2 million German or germanized inhabitants, completely independent from Germany and connected by some loose ties — such as a customs union — with Poland. At the
one preserved copy of it — and gives here a reproduction of its title page, and sample pages of its text.
Its text, however, is well known in Polish translation as such a translation has been published in 1925 as an annex to Roman Dmowiski’s book (and to all its subsequent editions) “Polityka poiska i o'dbudowanie Panstwa” (Polish politics and the reconstitution of the state).
PROBLEMS OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
London: July, 1917
Blue-print for tihe Settlement of Versailles. Roman Dmcwski’s memorandum of July 1917
By courtesy of the Library of the Polish Institute and General Sikorski' Museum, London
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It is but natural that the present war, the greatest in the history of the world, should have provoked a copious literature, dealing with the reconstruction of Europe, drawing frontiers which never existed, breaking up entire States and building new ones. It is also natural that experienced statesmen should look upon those attempts at redrawing the map with suspicion, taking them for irresponsible works, produced at a library.- table by men who have done nothing in their lives but write and who know nothing of the conditions necessary to the existence of States. Statesmen are taught conservatism by experience, they mistrust the unknown; they would prefer to see the status quo ante maintained wherever possible: they know more or less what to expect from the States which existed before the war, and know besides that new formations are more than likely to become sources of new and unexpected troubles. On the other hand, they see that this war, after the lapse of nearly three years, is still far from having reached a decisive moment, and that any radical change of the siattis quo is likely to be brought about only by a war of much longer duration, by gigantic new efforts, by more bloodshed; and they doubt at times if they can take responsibility for so much human suffering. Great catastrophes have not always involved great changes in structure. After the Napoleonic wars, which had disturbed existing international conditions far more than the present war, the Congress of Vienna re-established to a great extent the old frontiers, even allowing for the fact that it sanctioned one of the greatest revolutions which ever took place on the map of Europe: the Partitions of Poland. It is therefore conceivable that the present war might end by a return to'the pre-war frontiers, Belgium, give up a larger or smaller part of Alsace-Lorraine, agree to the annexation of the Austrian Trentino by Italy, resign herself to the re-establishment of Serbia and Montenegro, to the emancipation from Turkey of Arabia and Armenia, even to the loss of Bagdad by the Ottoman Empire; but if her position in Central and Eastern Europe remain undisturbed—in which case it would not merely be as strong as it was before the war, but actually strengthened by the progress of Austria-Hungary’s subjugation, by the control of an apparently emancipated Poland, and by the disintegration of Russia—she knows that all her peripheric failures will be but temporary. A new war in a not distant future would then become inevitable, a war fraught with incomparably greater chances for a complete German victory. |
EuroPe °PPonents |
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So disastrous a future can be prevented only by striking to-day into the very heart of German power. The solution of the great problems of this war lies neither in the Balkans, nor in Asia Minor, but in Central Europe itself. A fundamental reconstruction of Europe, which would reduce German power to the natural limits of the German race, calling to independent life those nations which are now enslaved by Germany and forced to serve her aims of conquest, is indispensable to the re-establishment of European equilibrium; there is no other means of putting a stop to German expansion in the East, of saving the freedom of all nations and of making them secure against degradation and ruin. The destruction of European equilibrium to the advantage of Germany is due in part to causes which no human power can remove—to the fact that the Germans are numerically the strongest race on the Continent of Europe, that this race in the course of the nineteenth century developed into a solid nation, tied together by firm bonds of solidarity, that in the present stage of its evolution that nation is impelled by a strong aggressive tendency, and that it has been able to organise itself into a powerful Empire. To destroy the German nation or to draw it back to the status of disintegration, breaking it up' into a series of small States, is impossible, as impossible as to deprive the Germans of those qualities and faults which make of them a great aggressive Power. Great, however, as is the strength of the German nation, it rest of the great German race. In other words, the Austro- Hungarian Empire which, through national evolution and national differentiation, now possesses no internal stability, is being preserved by an external force, vifc., by the German Empire, because its continuation is necessary in the interests of the German race. |
The reconstruction of Europe a necessity.
Austria’s existence preserved by Germany.
The future of Austria-Hungary.
Austria as an element of German power. |
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The future of Austria-Hungary after the present war will be the best criterion of the whole issue of the war itself. If Austria- Hungary be preserved—and it can only be preserved on the basis of German and Magyar hegemony—Germany will have won a political victory, one which will-enable her still to carry on her policy of subjugation among the Central European nationalities and of conquest in the Near East. The true defeat of Germany—such a defeat as would definitely paralyse German ambitions and prevent the outbreak of another war in the near future-r-would inevitably imply the .end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. . To summarise : the national evolution of Europe called forth the power of the German race—which, always numerically strong, had since the end of the Middle Ages been politically disintegrated—for it led to German unity and to the establishment of a German Empire powerful in proportion to the strength of the race. But Germany’s increase of power was likewise furthered by the fact that national evolution had not yet found expression in the political organisation of the rest of Central Europe : that there remained, in the shape of Austria-Hungary, a survival of the period when many races, non-German and having nothing in common with the Germans, lived under German rule, tied by a close alliance to the German Empire, forced even to fight for Germany’s ends. The re-establishment of European equilibrium will only be possible when the power of Germany is reduced to such limits as are proper to the. strength of the German race, and when she is deprived of the means of exploiting the strength and the resources of other nations for her own aims of conquest. This can only be realised by the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and by completing Europe’s political organisation upon a national basis. If we speak of breaking up Austria-Hungary it is not because we are unaware, of the immense difficulty of the task, but because we understand that in no other way can Europe be preserved from
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Destruction of Austria. |
ZAGADNIENIA
SRODKOWO- I WSCHODNIQ-EUROPEJSKIE
(przez E. Dmowskiego)
LONDYN, LIPIEC 1917 K., DRUKOWANE NA PRAWACH REKOPISU Przekład z angielskiego:
PROBLEMS OP CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE LONDON, JULY 1917, PRIVATELY PRINTED
WSTEP
PRZEBUDOWA EUROPY; JEJ PRZECIWNICY
Jest rzecz całkiem zrozumiała, że wojna obecna, największa w dziejach świata, wywołała obfita literaturę poświęconą przebudowie Europy, kreśląc granice, które nigdy nie istniały, rozwalając cale państwa i budująca nowe. Również zrozumiałem jest, że wytrawni mężowie stanu patrz na te próby przerobienia karty Europy podejrzliwie, uważając je za roboty nieodpowiedzialne, wykonane przy biurku przez ludzi, którzy nie zajmowali w życiu jeno pisaniem i którzy o warunkach istnienia państw nie maja pojęcia. Doświadczenie uczy mężów stanu konserwatyzmu, nie dowierzają oni temu, czego nie znają: wiedzą mniej więcej, czego można oczekiwać od państw, które istniały przed wojna, i wiedza również, te nowe formacje według wszelkiego prawdopodobieństwa staną się źródłem nowych, a nieoczekiwanych zawikłań. Z drugiej strony, widza oni, że ta wojna, po upływie blisko trzech lat, jest ciągle jeszcze daleka od osiągniecia momentu decydującego, że wszelka zmiana radykalna status quo mogłaby być sprowadzona tylko przez znaczne przedłużenie wojny, przez nowe, olbrzymie wysiłki, przez więcej przelewu krwi; i budzi się w nich wątpliwość, czy można wziąć odpowiedzialność za tak wiele ludzkiego cierpienia.
Wielkie katastrofy nie zawsze pociągały za sobą wielkie zmiany w budowie. Po wojnach napoleońskich, które wstrząsnęły o wiele silniej niż obecna wojna, istniejącemu stosunkami międzynarodowymi, Kongres Wiedeński przywrócił w znacznej mierze dawne granice; nie należy pomijać faktu, że usankcjonował jeden z największych przewrotów, jakiego dokonano na mapie Europy: rozbiory Polski. Łatwo przeto wyobrazić sobie, że wojna obecna mogłaby się zakończyć powrotem do granic przedwojennych, z tym pozornym skutkiem, że międzynarodowy porządek rzezy nie uległby zmianie na korzyść żadnego z mocarstw.
Dwa wielkie cele agresywnej polityki niemieckiej, o których tak wiele mówiono ostatniemi czasy — zniszczenie supremacji Wielkiej Brytanii na morzach i rozstrzygniecie kwestii Bliskiego Wschodu w Sensie niemieckim przez wprowadzenie w życie systemu objętego nazwą Berlin - Bagdad — jak się zdaje, nie maja żadnych widoków urzeczywistnienia. Niemcy, od początku wojny, zostały wymiecione z wielkich mórz, utraciły swoje posiadłości kolonialne, ich środki wojny morskiej zostały sprowadzone do piraterii podwodnej, i według wszelkiego prawdopodobieństwa po zakończeniu wojny zjawia się one ponownie na morzach ze znacznie ograniczoną potęgą. Co zaś do ich planów kontynentalnych, to Bagdad
First page of the Polish translation of the Dmowski memorandum of July 1©17, as published from 1925 as a Supplement to all editions of Dmowski’s book “Polityka polska i odbudowanie panstwa”. Taiken from Hamover edition of 1947
same time he considered it to be appropriate and in accordance with the principle oif respect for national rights, to allow Austria proper, if she so wished, to become a part of Germany.
Eastern Prussia was not detached from Germany and in consequence Poland’s province of Eastern Pomerania became a “corridor”, cutting into two the territories of the German Reich. This was a situation similar to the situation of the United States whose integral part, Alaska, is being cut off from the rest of the country by a Canadian “corridor” of Vancouver, or the situation of Zaire (former Belgian Congo) which has a narrow access to the sea, flanked by Angolan (formerly Portuguese) territories. Such a situation is not necessarily intolerable as is well shown by the American and Canadian, or Angolan and Zairean example — but in the case of Eastern Prussia it had become a cause or a pretext of German protests which contributed greatly to the outbreak of the Second World War: that war had nominally the “Polish Corridor” and Danzig as its cause. It is a pity that this cause or pretext had not been eliminated from the beginning, by bringing back the situation of earlier centuries (especially 1466- 1057) when Eastern Prussia was an autonomous state of German character but under the suzerainty of Poland.
Dmowski was a politician of genius, who saw all the European problems in the right proportions and understood also the spontaneous, revolutionary forces and currents which were ready to come to the surface and profit from the defeat of Germany and Austro-Hungary by establishing new political structures. He adapted his plan for Europe to the existing realities — and conceived a system which was at the same time viable, equitable and sufficiently strong; a system, which proved its conformity with reality by the fact that after he catastrophes of the Second World War it was able to survive. (A territorial system very similar to Versailles, with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Hungary as main elements re-emerged in 1945 almost automatically. The destruction of the Versailles system by the pacts of Tehran and Yalta was partly successful politically, but only in a limited way territorially).
The allied powers, France, Great Britain and the United States in 1918 and 1919 did not in fact have any clear plan for post-war Europe and they accepted and put into fulfilment the plan of Dmowski as formulated in his memorandum of July 1917.
It is a pity that they did this halfheartedly and not completely, and made Poland too weak and Germany too strong.
If Dmowski’s plan were fulfilled fully, or even if the Versailles system as it was actually established were later strongly and unhesitatingly defended, by France, toy Poland, but also — and first of all — toy Great Britain, there would have been no Second World War and the world would have been happier, more just, more prosperous, more orderly and more stable.
One more thing has to be said — and said quite frankly — about the settlement of Versailles.
There are some people in the Anglo-Saxon world (and also in France and some other countries) who say — or rather whisper, expressing views, which they think may sound cynical but are allegedly completely true, if unpleasant — that the Versailles system was probably based on justice — but as its main pillar was an independent Poland, this system was not strong enough to survive because Poland was and is too weak a country for this; and it is not possible to help weak countries to exist, or to protect them from injustices. One should, allegedly, have the courage to accept that lost causes are lost causes. Poland is a lost cause — in the same way as Cambodia, or the Kurds, or the Crimean Tartars, or Turkish Armenia, or the Christians in the Lebanon, and the Copts in Egypt are lost causes and one cannot help them, in spite of the fact that they have, each one, a case and they all have suffered great injustices and sufferings. Many so-called “friends of Poland” resemble the “friends of the Lebanon”, or “friends of Armenia”, or “friends of Vietnam” in that they would like to diminish in some way the sufferings of some Poles, or: sufferings of some Armenians, or Lebanese Maronites, or Vietnamese boat people, but they do not believe it to toe possible to save Poland (or Armenia, or the Lebanon, or the Christian part of the population of Vietnam) as such.
To this I wish to reply that Poland is not a lost cause. It is ridiculous to (believe that a country of 36 million inhabitants (almost all of whom speak the same language, have the same culture, profess the same religion, are animated by the same fervent patriotism, share the same, 1000-years old history, belong to the same race, are well developed economically and on the whole are well educated, and live in a compact mass in a densely populated territory) could be a lost cause. Yes, this is true that geographically, Poland is placed between two larger countries. (There are nearly 90 million Germans in the two Germanies and in Austria taken together. There are 260 million people in the Soviet Union, of which 130 million are Russians. There exist in their respective countries two and half times as many Germans and almost four times as many Russians as Poles). But there is nothing abnormal in the fact that smaller countries are neighbors of large ones. There are six times as many Chinese as Russians but this does not make the Russians despair off their future and does not make Russia a lost cause. There are 3 and half times as many Spaniards as Portuguese, but this does not make Portugal insecure in its isolated position, surrounded by Spanish territory.
lt is not the fact that Germany and Russia are larger and stronger than Poland which makes Poland’s position difficult, but the fact that both Poland’s main neighbours are rapacious and expansionist nations. But Poland is essentially a strong country and has an enormous capacity for survival. What she needs from other countries — this is not so much obtaining help, as not being harmed.
The system of Versailles was overthrown not because it was not strong enough, or was not viable. In fact, this is the only system — in broad outlines — which is capable of surviving in the long run and making Europe strong, orderly and happy. It was overthrown because powerful forces wanted it to be destroyed. It was not only Germany who wanted to destroy the system of Versailles. It was also Great Britain. And in consequence of British influence a government was imposed upon Poland which also contributed to the destruction of Versailles. Versailles was destroyed by the compacts off Locarno (1926) and Munich (1938) and its destruction was confirmed by the pacts of
On the reverse—The map by Jakob Spett: “Nationalitatenkarb der ostlichen Provinzen des Deutschen Reiches”, Gotha, Justu PartheSi 1910.
From the codection of the Library oif Congress, Washington D.C., US^
Tehran (1943) and of Yalta (1945). It was the Western powers who were the grave-diggers of Versailles.
Poland was the pillar of Versailles. But she was and also is the pillar of Europe. This is, what was said, very correctly, by the acute English observer, the thinker and author G.K. Chesterton, in December 1918, when the First World War was just terminated, but the peace conference which had to prepare the treaty of Versailles, did not assemble yet9).
If Poland is a lost cause — then also Europe is a lost cause. Because Europe may be dominated by Germany — as was the aim of the German Empire in the Middle Ages and as it was already almost an accomplished fact at the time of Hitler — but such a Europe would no more really be Europe. It may also be conquered by Russia — and this also would mean its annihilation, even if for a short time only. (A Russian-conquered Europe would not last long). It too can be obliterated, powerless and ruined, divided into American and Soviet spheres of interest and influence. But it cannot be any more, as it was in the 19th century, a continent organized on the principle of a “balance of power”, surveilled by Great Britain. It cannot also survive in the illusory form Of a “United Europe”, or “Common Market”, which are all only ridiculous palliatives of a real European order. If Europe has to be free and strong and if she has to play the role which is rightfully hers, — she must return to her pre-18th century traditions. And for this, she needs the important pillar which is a strong, free and influential Poland.
9) “It is (...) a question of (...) whether we like you more than England, more than Europe, more than Poland, the pillar of Europe (my e.mphas's — J.G.), more than honour, more than freedom, more than facts”. (Gilbert K. Chesterton “The Sign of the World’s end. An open letter to Lord Heading”. “The New Witness”, London, Dec. 13, 1918).
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4 — In Defence
